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Introduction 
The Deep South of Thailand has been plagued by violence and underdevelopment for 
decades. Bordering the Federation of Malaysia, the three southernmost provinces 
are mostly populated by ethnic Muslim Malays who speak a dialect of Malay called 
Melayu Patani (Liow, 2006a, p. 27, 2006b; McCargo, 2008, p. 4). Historically the region 
was part of the independent Sultanate of Patani2 and was later annexed by Thailand 
in the early twentieth century (Kershaw, 2001; McCargo, 2008, p. 61; Perkasa, 2008, p. 
41). Separatist movements have existed in the region since Siam started to exercise 
greater influence over the region in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, but the highest point of the insurgency came during the 1970s and 1980s when 
several separatist groups joined forces with the Communist Party of Thailand to fight 
the Central government (Perkasa, 2008; Ungpakorn, 2007). Nevertheless, the insur-
gency was thought to have been exhausted by the 1990s due to effective counterin-
surgency tactics by the military and strong American support for the armed forces 
(Jitpiromrisi & McCargo, 2008). In 2004 an important army armoury was raided and 
several bombs detonated in the Southern provinces (“Child Recruitment and Use in 
Southern Thailand“, 2008, p. 6; Perkasa, 2008). Since that year more than 3,000 people 
have died due to the violence in the South. Owing to instability of the central govern-
ment, the army was given almost absolute control over the Southern provinces and 
martial law was imposed (Perkasa, 2008; Ungpakorn, 2007). The result has been a pol-
icy of dealing with the insurgency through military methods which closely resemble 
the ones used to fight the once powerful Communist Party of Thailand through raid 
and sweep operations in villages and internment of suspects in concentration camps 
for prolonged periods of time (Liow, 2006b, p. 43; Perkasa, 2008; Ungpakorn, 2007). 
The result of the current policy has been an exponential increase in the defence 
budget, increased unemployment in the South, and a rise in local support for the 
insurgency (Gunaratna & Acharya, 2006, p. 149; Perkasa, 2008; Yegar, 2002). Finally, 
paramilitary militias have been formed in Buddhist villages in the South with the sup-
port of the Palace and the security establishment (Ungpakorn, 2007; von Feigenblatt, 
2  To avoid confusion concerning the use of the terms ‘Pattani’ and ‘Patani’: After the Malay-speaking regions in 
Southern Thailand were integrated into Siam in the early twentieth century, Malay-sounding names have been 
converted to names that are phonetically in tune with Thai rhythm. Hence, ‘Pattani’ is the official romanisation of 
the Thai spelling. ‘Patani’, on the other hand, is the Malay version,  often used in historical contexts or when referring 
to historical claims over the territory.ASEAS 4(1)
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2009a; 2009b, p. 5). These paramilitary militias have attacked Muslim villages with 
impunity. 
Importance of the Southern Unrest for Thailand and the Region
The insurgency and unrest in the Southern provinces of Thailand have caused more 
than 3,000 deaths since 2004. In addition to that, the problem has weakened succes-
sive civilian governments with the result of strengthening the hand of the security 
forces and the Palace (ALRC, 2009, p. 1; Chang, Chu, & Park, 2007, p. 76; Hamlin, 2009; 
Neher, 2002; Ungpakorn, 2007). Furthermore, the unrest has been used as an excuse 
to increase the military budget by more than 300 percent in five years and thus 
diverting needed funds away from development projects (Askew, 2010, p. 130; von 
Feigenblatt, 2010). The violence in the region has negatively affected the important 
tourism industry not only in the Southern provinces but also in the entire country 
with the net effect of damaging the already precarious state of the economy, which 
was facing a 2.2 percent contraction in 2009 due to the global financial crisis (CIA, 
2009). Moreover, the breakdown of the rule of law in the Southern provinces, and to a 
certain extent in the entire country, has led to a sharp increase in illegal business ac-
tivities such as smuggling drugs and weapons through the porous Malaysian border, 
thus giving rise to violent crime (Askew, 2010, p. 57; von Feigenblatt, 2010). Finally, the 
Muslim identity of the insurgency has fueled speculation about possible infiltration 
by regional Islamic terrorist networks such as Jeemah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda (Gu-
naratna & Acharya, 2006; Liow, 2006a, p. 93). In addition, the region is considered to 
serve as a litmus test of separatist tendencies in other regions with historical experi-
ence of independence and semiautonomy (Means, 2009). In summary, dealing with 
the Southern unrest is important for economic, security, and humanitarian reasons. 
Possible Beneficiaries of the Greater Pattani  
Autonomous Economic and Administrative Region
To  establish  a  Greater  Pattani  Autonomous  Economic  and  Administrative  Region 
would be beneficial for the entire country — with the exception of the armed forces 
and the Palace. Possibly modelled after the Special Administrative regions of China, 
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Hong Kong and Macau, and the Basque region in Spain, the policy would combine 
greater  self-government  with  a  strong  economic  development  component.  Thus 
economic integration into the national and global economy, which while not easily 
achieved is possible, as demonstrated by the experience of Bali and Beppu as tourist 
destinations, would substitute for government centralisation in the administrative 
realm (Barber, 1996). Therefore the challenge would be to privatise governance and 
thus raise it to the international level while at the same time making it sensitive to 
local needs. By dealing with the core grievances of the Melayu Patani population 
and also with the problem of underdevelopment in the region, the new Greater Pat-
tani Autonomous Economic and Administrative Region would lower the incidence of 
violent crime, assuage fears of religious and local leaders about the loss of distinct 
socio-cultural heritage of the area, and avoid a complete rupture of the region with 
Thailand. Furthermore, the economic benefits reaped from the development of the 
area and the increase in productivity of the rubber industry of the South would also 
benefit the rest of the country through greater tax revenues and a subsequent in-
crease in tourism. Greater stability will also be of great benefit to the entire country 
and would free needed resources away from the defence budget and into infrastruc-
ture development in other underdeveloped regions such as the Northeast. 
From a political perspective, the civilian central government would be strength-
ened vis-à-vis the military and thus increase stability in the country. Only the Palace 
and the armed forces would be weakened by the proposed policy due to their rela-
tive loss of influence. While the military and the Palace could attempt to claim some 
credit from the pacification of the South, the perceived loss in sovereignty would 
ultimately weaken the traditional security views of the military and Palace establish-
ment. 
Competing Policy Options for the Southern Unrest
Several policy options have been proposed for dealing with the Southern unrest. 
The policy that is currently in place can be labelled the “military counterinsurgency 
strategy” and combines overwhelming force with intelligence gathering (ALRC, 2009; 
Askew, 2010; Ungpakorn, 2007). A second option proposed by some academics and 
the insurgents in the South is the peaceful separation of the three southernmost ASEAS 4(1)
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provinces to become either the Republic of Patani or the Sultanate of Patani (Perkasa, 
2008; Ungpakorn, 2007; von Feigenblatt, 2009c, p. 606). This option is based on the 
norm of self-determination for ethnonational groups and on the historical claim over 
the territory (Perkasa, 2008; Syukri, 1985). Another variant of this policy is the option 
of the three provinces, Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat, joining the Federation of Malay-
sia, however this option was only seriously considered during the 1940s (Askew, 2010; 
von Feigenblatt, 2009b, p. 4). Finally, a third category of policies involves some form 
of self-government combined with economic development. Several proposals in this 
category favour some devolution of authority to local governments in the South and 
greater development through increased trade with Malaysia and Singapore or an im-
provement in local industry (Jitpiromrisi & McCargo, 2008). Geographical proximity 
to Malaysia is an advantage that can be utilised by promoting the integration of the 
local economy into Malaysia’s production chain. In other words, economic integra-
tion at the sub-regional level can take the place of political integration and thus allow 
the South to benefit from the positive externalities of joining a relatively advanced 
production chain in sectors as diverse as automobile manufacturing and electron-
ics. While the military strategy has proven to be futile in dealing with the unrest, 
the second option which involved complete independence or annexation with the 
Federation of Malaysia is unrealistic due to lack of political capital and the relative 
weakness of the insurgency (von Feigenblatt, 2009d). However, the third category of 
policy options is more promising than the first in terms of effectiveness in dealing 
with the core grievances of the local population and at the same time it does not 
impinge on national sensitivities regarding the territorial integrity of the Thai nation-
state. In terms of political capital and the relative power of interest groups, the first 
option clearly has the upper hand at this point, however, some positive signs can be 
identified showing that the third category would be feasible in the near future (Per-
kasa, 2008; Ungpakorn, 2007). 
Analytical Framework
This study follows an elite theory model of public policy making (Anderson, 2006). 
While this model has many weaknesses, it is a good fit for the Thai political sys-
tem and socio-cultural environment. The Thai political system is elitist and revolves 
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around the Palace. Governance depends on a network monarchy which includes the 
armed forces and a powerful bureaucratic elite. Thailand’s government is strongly 
unitary in nature and the provinces are directly controlled by the capital. An elite 
model concentrates on the role of a small group of power brokers in the policy mak-
ing process. The population is assumed to be a passive player under the control of 
the elite. Thailand has been characterised by anthropologists and area specialists 
as a highly hierarchical society with a very large power distance (Chang et al., 2007; 
Mulder, 1996; von Feigenblatt, Suttichujit, Shuib, Keling, & Ajis, 2010; Wyatt, 2003). 
Moreover, the undemocratic history of the country serves as evidence of the role of 
a small group of power holders in making the important decisions (Albritton & Bu-
reekul, 2007; Ungpakorn, 2007). Nevertheless, some aspects of constructivist social 
theory will be used to describe the role of the militants in the South and of the Ma-
lay community in general. The reason for this is that the Southern unrest is partly a 
grassroots movement and thus its behaviour cannot be duly explained by elite theory 
and needs to be understood from the point of view of those involved in the struggle 
(Perkasa, 2008; Ungpakorn, 2007). It should be noted that while elite theory provides 
the best theoretical fit to explain the actions of the Thai side of the issue, it lacks the 
explanatory traction to explain the yearnings and grievances of the less centralised 
Muslim Malays. Identity needs are important and constructivist theory, with its em-
phasis on norms and ideas and how they shape social action, provides a useful lens 
to complement elite theory (Jackson & Nexon, 2009). 
Stakeholders
The Southern unrest involves a vast array of stakeholders and thus any proposed 
policy to deal with it must include them in both, the decision making process and 
most importantly during its implementation. Stakeholders can be roughly classified 
as Thai and Malay. External stakeholders will also be discussed in terms of their rela-
tionship to the two sides. 
Armed Forces (State and Non-State)
Arguably, the most important group of stakeholders in the Southern unrest involves ASEAS 4(1)
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armed groups (Gunaratna & Acharya, 2006; Storey, 2008). Included in this category 
are both state and non-state armed groups. The most powerful stakeholder in the 
military realm is the Royal Thai Army (Gunaratna & Acharya, 2006; McCargo, 2008; 
Ungpakorn, 2007). More than just a subservient branch of the government, it is a 
semi-independent institution with its own power resources and interests (McCa-
rgo, 2008; Ungpakorn, 2007; von Feigenblatt, 2009c). Historically, the Thai Army has 
been used mostly for internal counterinsurgency operations (Yegar, 2002). The United 
States supported it during the 1970s and 1980s so that it could defeat the Communist 
Party of Thailand and serve as a bastion of capitalism in South-East Asia (Kershaw, 
2001; Neher, 2002; Rolfe, 2008). In addition to that, it is not a professional army in the 
modern sense of the word. Officers consider their troops to be their source of power 
and are more than willing to use them for their own interests. More than ten mili-
tary coups have taken place in Thailand in recent history (Ungpakorn, 2007, 2010; von 
Feigenblatt, 2009e, p. 4; Wyatt, 2003). In terms of ideology, the Thai Army is highly 
conservative and royalist. Nationalism is strong in the army and it considers itself 
to be constrained only by the needs of the nation and the Monarchy, not the civilian 
government (Handley, 2006; Ungpakorn, 2007, 2010). 
The army has virtually complete control over the Southern provinces and has im-
posed martial law (Liow, 2006a, 2006b, p. 37). Abuses of human rights are wide-
spread and the army favours a traditional counterinsurgency strategy to deal with 
the Southern unrest (Dingwerth, 2008; Jitpiromrisi & McCargo, 2008; McCargo, 2008, 
2009; Perkasa, 2008). In terms of economic interest, the Army is corrupt and is in-
volved in the smuggling of weapons across the Malay border, among other illicit ac-
tivities (Askew, 2010; Perkasa, 2008). The violence in the South has also been used to 
justify exponential increases in the budget for the military (Ungpakorn, 2007, 2010). 
The police are comparatively weaker than the army but are similarly characterised 
by virulent Thai nationalism and corruption (Askew, 2010). It has been involved in a 
turf war with the army over influence in the South (Ungpakorn, 2007, 2010). Further-
more it has also been known to commit abuses in the Southern Provinces but not of 
the same scale as the army. Politically, the police are identified with the former Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was deposed by the military coup in 2006 (Askew, 
2010; Ungpakorn, 2007; von Feigenblatt, 2009e, pp. 3-5). Thus, it is viewed with suspi-
cion by the armed forces. The civilian government has more influence over the police 
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than over the army.
Paramilitary groups are involved in the Southern unrest. Buddhist militias organ-
ised by the police and the army with the support of the Palace have increased in 
number since 2004 (McCargo, 2008, 2009). Buddhist militias are usually very nation-
alistic and carry out vigilante attacks on Muslim villagers. The lack of direct control 
over them by the central government means that there is very little accountability 
regarding their actions. In general, Buddhist militias have a vested interest in the con-
tinued presence of the armed forces in the South so as to defend their interests. On 
the Muslim side there are about ten different militias with a total of fewer than 2,000 
fighters (Jitpiromrisi & McCargo, 2008; Perkasa, 2008). The fragmented nature of the 
militant groups makes it difficult to provide a clear picture of the relative strength 
of each group and their overall goals. However, one of the oldest and best known 
groups is the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) which was founded by a 
descendant of the last Rajah of Patani in the mid-twentieth century (Perkasa, 2008; 
Syukri, 1985). This organisation has both a political and a military branch and its 
main goal is to coordinate the attacks of the separate militant groups. Its military 
force is thought to range from 300 to 500 armed fighters. Its leadership is composed 
of intellectuals trained in the Middle East and exiled Malay aristocrats in Malaysia 
(Liow, 2006a, 2006b; Perkasa, 2008). Its goal is the re-establishment of the Sultanate 
of Patani or at least the achievement of autonomy within the Thai state. The main 
interest of this group is the protection of the distinct Malay Muslim culture in the 
South of Thailand and guaranteeing enough leadership jobs for members of the Mus-
lim Malay intelligentsia (Perkasa, 2008). While PULO is not a very large organisation, 
it has the tacit support of the majority of the Malay population, and also has links 
with Muslim countries and organisations all over the world (Askew, 2010; Gunaratna 
& Acharya, 2006). It should be noted that there are other insurgent groups operat-
ing in the South of Thailand which are considered by some scholars to be equally as 
important as or even more important than PULO such as BRN but there is very little 
information regarding its structure and membership in comparison to PULO (Liow, 
2006b). The other groups tend to be more secretive and lack an overt political arm 
which makes it difficult to assess their true support and resources (Askew, 2010; 
Funston, 2010; Joll, 2010). Finally, there is a third kind of militia operating in the Deep 
South of Thailand without a clear political agenda. Transnational organised crime ASEAS 4(1)
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(TOC) is omnipresent along the porous border with Malaysia and it has at its service 
armed bands of militants (Jones & Smith, 2007; Millard, 2004; Storey, 2008). Drugs, 
human trafficking, and smuggling rings all operate in the region and have links with 
powerful local politicians and officers. The Democrat Party is widely believed to be 
involved in criminal activities in the South along with certain elements in the armed 
forces and the police (Askew, 2010; Ungpakorn, 2007, 2010). TOC groups have a vested 
interest in the Southern unrest in that they want the conflict to continue so as to 
guarantee an uncertain environment for their illicit activities. 
Civilian Government and Bureaucrats
The civilian government and the bureaucracy consider the unrest in the South a major 
problem. It weakens their authority relative to the armed forces and is detrimental to 
the overall economy of the country (Askew, 2010; Glassman, 2005; Ungpakorn, 2010). 
However, it should be noted that with the exception of former Prime Minister Thak-
sin Shinawatra, most civilian governments do not have very strong national support 
and their power base is greatly limited by the Palace and the armed forces (Chang et 
al., 2007; Ungpakorn, 2007, 2010). This is evidenced by the recurrent coups d’état, con-
stitutional changes, and interference by the Palace (Dressel, 2009; Ungpakorn, 2007, 
2010; von Feigenblatt, 2009e; Wyatt, 2003). Most civilian governments function as 
mediators representing a vast array of interests including business, the military, and 
the Palace. Moreover, a majority of civilian governments have been forced to hand 
over the control of the South to the military and have had their arms tied in terms 
of negotiating with the insurgents (Lintner, 2009, pp. 112-115; Ungpakorn, 2007). Due 
to the influence of narrow interests on the weak civilian administrations, the gov-
ernment has to appear strong in terms of defending national sovereignty and Thai 
nationalism. One of the only differences between administrations is the preference 
of the Shinawatra faction for the involvement of the police in the South rather than 
the military and the support of the Democrat Party for greater involvement of the 
military (ALRC, 2009; Ungpakorn, 2007). 
Bureaucrats in Thailand are generally very conservative and nationalist and tend 
to come from Bangkok and central Thailand. Civil service examinations are usually 
passed by members of the elite due to structural advantages such as better access to 
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education at the secondary and tertiary levels and are the preferred career of ethnic 
Thais (Askew, 2007). Due to Thailand’s political instability, the bureaucracy is one of 
the only constants in the country. Most bureaucrats serve under many administra-
tions and even constitutions. In general, the main interest of the bureaucracy is the 
continued influence of its members over the administration of the South of Thailand 
and the defence of national sovereignty. 
As explained in a previous section of this paper, the Democrat Party is the strong-
est party in the South and there are allegations that several prominent members are 
involved in criminal activities along the Malaysian border. Nevertheless, the exact na-
ture of their involvement is not known but several independent scholars have found 
evidence of their involvement in several illicit enterprises (Liow, 2006a; Ungpakorn, 
2010). While the role of the Democrat Party in illicit activities remains in dispute, the 
political party is actively involved in the traditional patronage politics of the region 
and thus exerts considerable power at the local level (McCargo, 2008). 
Traditional Leaders
This category includes Muslim religious leaders, Malay aristocrats, and the Thai Pal-
ace. Muslim religious leaders derive their authority from their role in the pondok 
network of Islamic schools, their control over mosques, and the high regard Muslims 
traditionally have for teachers (Askew, 2007; Means, 2009; Millard, 2004; Mulder, 1996; 
Ungpakorn, 2007). In addition, they are considered to be the protectors of Malay 
Muslim culture in the Deep South of Thailand. Their main interest is to protect the 
Muslim religion and the Malay language, and to have some influence over local gov-
ernance. Most religious leaders have expressed a fear of government encroachment 
on Malay religious and cultural affairs (Liow, 2006a; Perkasa, 2008; von Feigenblatt, 
2009c). They have also alleged that the government has tried to reduce their power by 
bringing pondok schools under the control of the Ministry of Education (Jitpiromsri 
& McCargo, 2008; Ungpakorn, 2007). Most religious leaders ask for religious freedom 
and some form of autonomy for the region. Identity needs are usually at the fore-
front of their demands (von Feigenblatt, 2009d, 2010). Most do not request complete 
independence. Closely related to this group are the traditional Malay nobility. The de-
scendants of the former ruling Houses of the region are related to the Royal Houses ASEAS 4(1)
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of several Sultanates in Malaysia (Kershaw, 2001; Ungpakorn, 2007; Yegar, 2002). This 
group was traditionally headed by the direct descendant of the last Rajah of Patani, 
who later on went into exile in the Sultanate of Kelantan (Wyatt, 2003; Yegar, 2002). 
They derive their legitimacy from hundreds of years of history in the region and 
their connection to the culture and traditions of Patani (Perkasa, 2008). Most of the 
Tunkus, Malay Princes, of Patani have been involved in the separatist movement in 
one way or another and most favour some form of autonomy for the region and the 
restoration of their Houses. The Princes enjoy the support of the majority of the reli-
gious leaders as well as of the population and they also have international legitimacy 
due to their historic relationship with the Sultanates of Malaysia and Great Britain 
(Millard, 2004).
The Palace, as it is known, encompasses the Royal Family and the Privy Council 
(Handley, 2006; Ishii, 1994, p. 458; Kershaw, 2001; Yegar, 2002). In Thailand, the Privy 
Council is composed of powerful retired generals who rule from behind the scenes 
(Kershaw, 2001; Ungpakorn, 2007, 2010; Wyatt, 2003). The present members of the 
Royal Family are not direct descendents of the previous few kings and the present 
King was actually born in the United States (Handley, 2006; Kershaw, 2001). Conserva-
tive generals revived the institution of the Monarchy in the post-war years and the 
present King was elected by the head of the previous ruling family. In order to give 
the King some semblance of legitimacy, the new Royal Family was included in the 
previous Chakri Dynasty even though this is in fact a new dynasty (Handley, 2006; 
Ungpakorn, 2007). Massive propaganda campaigns raised the profile of the monarch 
and his family. After years of a concerted propaganda campaign and indoctrination 
through the media and schools, the Monarchy gained a lot of influence over govern-
ment affairs (Kershaw, 2001; Ungpakorn, 2007; von Feigenblatt et al., 2010; Wyatt, 
2003). The King has given his blessing to several military coups and the Queen has 
encouraged the organisation of Buddhist militias in the South (McCargo, 2008; Pitiya-
nuwat & Sujiva, 2005). Through the use of the draconian lèse majesté laws, which 
make any insult or criticism of the King a criminal offence punishable by up to 15 
years in prison, conservative politicians have tried to silence alternative centres of 
power, including the traditional Malay nobility and the Communist Party (Le-Coz, 
2009; Neher, 2002; Ungpakorn, 2007, 2010; von Feigenblatt, 2009c). The Palace tends 
to be the most nationalist and conservative institution in the country and is usually 
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linked to the armed forces. Among the most important interests of the Palace is the 
protection of sovereignty over the South, the assimilation of the Malay Muslims in 
the South, and most importantly the silencing of alternative histories of the region 
showing the legitimacy of Malay Royal Houses (Perkasa, 2008; Ungpakorn, 2007). In 
terms of power, it is probably one of the most powerful institutions in the country 
due to its considerable wealth, informal influence, and connections with the armed 
forces (Kershaw, 2001). 
Business Interests
Tin mining and rubber plantations, among others, are some of the important busi-
nesses in the region (Perkasa, 2008; Yegar, 2002). Most tin mines and rubber planta-
tions are owned by Chinese and ethnic Thais. Business owners in the region tend to 
be non-ideological in that they support whoever gives them protection and allows 
them to do business (Askew, 2007). This means that some pay protection money to 
corrupt members of the armed forces and to the Muslim insurgents. Some even pay 
both sides (Liow, 2006a, 2006b). There is also an important link between business 
interests and Democrat politicians who have a stake in some enterprises (Perkasa, 
2008; Ungpakorn, 2010). In general, business owners want peace in order to do busi-
ness and they want the region to remain part of Thailand (Askew, 2007). They also 
have an interest in improving the infrastructure of the area and facilitating trade. In 
terms of power, business owners are relatively weak in that they control resources 
but they depend on others for their security. Moreover, since most of them are Chi-
nese, they are usually not involved in the bureaucracy and suffer from some of the 
same discrimination as most other minority groups in Thailand (Askew, 2010; Ungpa-
korn, 2007, 2010; von Feigenblatt, 2009c, p. 598). 
External Interest Groups
Due to the religious factors in the unrest in the Deep South of Thailand there are 
external groups with an interest in the conflict (Kiong & Bun, 2001; Means, 2009; Mil-
lard, 2004; Perkasa, 2008). Malaysia and other Muslim countries have been involved 
in the conflict in one way or another. Due to the ethnic ties between Malays across ASEAS 4(1)
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the border, many insurgent leaders have moved to Malaysia in order to seek funds 
and support from fellow Muslim Malays (Liow, 2006a; Perkasa, 2008; Syukri, 1985). 
Conservative Malay political parties have indirectly supported the Muslim separatists 
in the South of Thailand by providing asylum as well as funds (Askew, 2007; Means, 
2009; Millard, 2004). In addition to that, Jemaah Islamiyah has also cooperated with 
the insurgents in terms of logistical support and in the arms trade (Gunaratna & 
Acharya, 2006; Yegar, 2002). Funding from Middle Eastern sources has also been chan-
nelled through charities in order to support the Muslim community. Libya has been 
one of the strongest supporters of the Muslim community in Thailand and has pro-
vided funds and political support (Yegar, 2002). 
On the other side of the conflict, the United States and its allies involved in the 
‘War on Terror’ have supported the Thai government in its characterisation of the 
Muslim insurgents as part of international Islamic terrorism. This means that the 
United States has supported the traditional counterinsurgency approach of the Thai 
government as an important front in the War on Terror (Neher, 2002; Yegar, 2002). 
Alternative Approaches to the Unrest in the Deep South of Thailand
There are other approaches to solving the unrest in the Deep South of Thailand 
besides the Autonomous Economic and Administrative Region approach that is pro-
posed in this paper, however, none of them are very promising in terms of achieving 
sustainable peace and development. One such option is the one proposed by Duncan 
McCargo and colleagues (Askew, 2007; Jitpiromrisi & McCargo, 2008). This proposal 
involves the establishment of a Ministry for the South. It basically recommends the 
concentration of the administration of the South under a single ministry rather than 
having it divided among separate ministries and government agencies. This proposal 
also stresses the importance of strengthening civil control over the administration 
of the region but stops short of recommending local governance (Jitpiromrisi & Mc-
Cargo, 2008). A Ministry for the South would make the administration of the region 
more efficient and would weaken the role of the military in the region but it would 
not deal with the most important grievances of the Muslim population in the South. 
Thus, this proposal can be considered to be administrative streamlining rather than 
a long term solution to the Southern unrest. This approach to the Southern unrest 
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does not include any greater autonomy for the region but simply a more efficient 
means of exerting direct control over a distant region of the country by the central 
government. 
Another possible solution to the Southern unrest would be to re-establish the 
nineteenth century system based on feudal tenure by the Malay aristocracy (Syukri, 
1985). Feudal tenure in the South of Thailand was based on the co-option of the Malay 
nobility into the administration of the region. This would provide some measure of 
autonomy under Thai sovereignty but would not be acceptable to the Thai govern-
ment nor to the armed forces (Jitpiromrisi & McCargo, 2008; Syukri, 1985). This pos-
sibility was very popular in the decades after World World II, but has since then lost 
popular support. Thus, this possibility suffers from a lack of political capital in order 
for it to be accepted by important stakeholders.
Consequences of the Creation of the Greater Pattani 
Autonomous Economic and Administrative Region
Possible consequences of the creation of the Greater Pattani Autonomous Economic 
and Administrative Region can be divided into three broad categories, namely eco-
nomic, political/security, and socio-cultural. On the economic front, the establish-
ment of the Greater Pattani Autonomous Economic and Administrative Region would 
increase trade with other provinces as well as with other members of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and attract foreign direct investment due to a 
more business friendly environment, greater political stability, and therefore a lower 
level of investment risk. This would create more jobs in the region as well as increase 
revenue for the central government in terms of taxes and tariffs. The transition from 
a military approach to one based on constructive engagement through the Greater 
Pattani Autonomous Economic and Administrative Region would translate into sav-
ings in armaments and a reduction in the military budget. The savings could then 
be reallocated to social services and development projects throughout the entire 
country. 
A failure to establish the Greater Pattani Autonomous Economic and Administra-
tive Region would result in continued capital flight due to the violence, a decline 
in the living standard of the inhabitants of the region, and a decline in the tourism ASEAS 4(1)
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industry of the country as a whole. Moreover, further increases in the budget of the 
armed forces could be expected (Askew, 2007; Ungpakorn, 2010).
Some important consequences of the proposed policy on the political and security 
fronts would be a drastic reduction in terms of the budget and size of the army. Its 
influence would also be diminished since its involvement in the South and in other 
security issues will be greatly reduced. Civilian governments will be strengthened 
through an improvement in the economy and in the security of the Southern prov-
inces. This could also have a positive impact on the general political stability of the 
country and reduce the likelihood of more military coups due to the improvement 
in the overall security of the country (von Feigenblatt, 2009c; von Feigenblatt et al., 
2010). Moreover, the police would be strengthened in comparison to the army, since 
it would be given greater responsibility for the internal security of the country and 
law enforcement. It can also be expected that the Democrat Party would be greatly 
weakened due to its links to the military and corruption in the Deep South (Ungpa-
korn, 2010). Transnational organised crime in the border provinces would also come 
under greater national and international scrutiny due to the possible increase in 
trade and foreign direct investment. Most importantly, Malay Muslims should par-
ticipate in greater numbers in the governance of the region. It is also expected that 
Malay Muslim politicians at the national level will also be strengthened due to the 
greater leverage they would gain through the establishment of the Autonomous Ad-
ministrative and Economic Region and the greater resources they would be able to 
muster. Thus, there would be a gradual shift of some political power away from the 
centre in Bangkok and towards the South (Askew, 2007). 
The possible consequences of failing to implement the recommended policy would 
mean a continuation of the status quo with all the unsatisfactory externalities that 
entails. Moreover, greater violence and local dislocation can be expected, as well as 
the further economic decline of the region and the country as a whole. Furthermore, 
the armed forces would continue to use the Southern unrest as an excuse to exercise 
influence in local and national politics (Kershaw, 2001; McCargo, 2004). 
Finally, on the socio-cultural front, the country as a whole would become more 
pluralistic (von Feigenblatt, 2009c; von Feigenblatt et al., 2010). This means that diver-
sity would be cherished rather than suppressed. Education could gradually be decen-
tralised based on the example set by the Greater Pattani Autonomous Administrative 
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and Economic Region so as to include the particular histories and religious practices 
of different ethnic groups (von Feigenblatt et al., 2010). There is also the possibility 
that this would lead to a negative backlash by the ethnic Thai population of central 
Thailand, at least in the short term. It could be vigorously resisted by the Palace and 
conservative elites in the capital. For the Malay Muslim community the adoption of 
this policy would satisfy many of its most important grievances and gradually lead 
to a decrease in fundamentalist Islam (Perkasa, 2008; Ungpakorn, 2007; Yegar, 2002). 
The reason for this is that the Malay Muslim Community would not feel threatened 
by the dominant culture any more, thanks to their autonomy, and this would reduce 
the need for fundamentalist teachings. Needless to say this assumes that part of the 
appeal of fundamentalism is due to existential uncertainty and the related fear of a 
possible loss of identity. Furthermore, the general population in the South will not 
be as open to extremist teachings if they feel that their culture and religion are alive 
and thriving (McCargo, 2009). 
The failure to implement the proposed policy would further alienate the Malay 
Muslim population and provide the perfect breeding ground for fundamentalist Is-
lamic extremism. Rather than leading to national unity, as conservatives claim, it 
would force ethnic and religious minorities to become more fundamentalist and to 
distance themselves from the majority in an attempt to protect their culture. This 
would in fact be a continuation of the present situation which has shown an increase 
in the teaching of a Middle Eastern variant of Islam which stresses stricter compli-
ance to religious teachings than the moderate version of Islam historically prevalent 
in the region (Mulder, 1996; Ramakrishna, 2005). 
In summary, the proposed policy offers advantages on economic, political/secu-
rity, and socio-cultural fronts. While there is the possibility of a negative backlash by 
conservative forces, this would only be a temporary setback. Failure to implement 
the establishment of the Greater Pattani Autonomous Economic and Administrative 
Region would be tantamount to a continuation of the present trend with all of the 
well known negative externalities. ASEAS 4(1)
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Making the Greater Pattani Autonomous 
Administrative and Economic Region a Reality
Funding and Economic Considerations
Due to the nature of the proposed policy, finding the necessary funding to undertake 
the establishment of the Greater Pattani Autonomous Administrative and Economic 
Region will not be very difficult. First of all, very little funding is required, since most 
changes are administrative, and the savings made in other areas can be invested in 
the development of the region. Savings in the realms of security and pacification 
could be used for investment in infrastructure and human capital. This would im-
prove the chances of the economic side of the policy being successful. 
More specifically, gradual reductions in the defence budget will free up plenty of 
resources that can then be partly used for the implementation of this policy. It is also 
likely that Malaysia and other Muslim countries would be willing to provide some 
funding for the development of the region under the proposed autonomy. This would 
pump needed foreign direct investment into the region and create jobs, in addition to 
lowering the cost of implementing the policy for the central government. 
Political Considerations
Political capital is the most important resource that will be necessary to move this 
policy forward. Civilian political parties should be convinced of the viability and ben-
efits of this policy so that they provide the political support necessary in order to 
overcome the opposition of the armed forces and some elements in the Palace. It 
would clearly benefit civilian political parties to demilitarise the South and to divert 
resources away from defence and into social projects. Further research should be 
conducted by national and international scholars so as to demonstrate the potential 
benefits of this policy and persuade civilian parties to adopt it. In this respect, the 
role of national NGOs and grassroots organisations will be pivotal in convincing poli-
ticians. Since NGOs and civil society in general are usually fragmented in Thailand 
and lack a clear leadership, an overarching steering committee should be formed to 
orchestrate and coordinate the political movement (Ungpakorn, 2010; Yegar, 2002).
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The Role of the Media
In Thailand, the media are very conservative and operate under strict censorship 
(Ungpakorn, 2007; von Feigenblatt, 2009c). It can be assumed that most mainstream 
media will be opposed to this policy due to their conservative nature and fears of 
reprisals by the military and the Palace. However, alternative media can be used, 
such as the internet, radio, and newsletters, to get the message across. Due to the 
tense political atmosphere related to the coming elections, the time is ripe for public 
pressure on politicians. Politicians will be more responsive to popular demands as 
the elections approach. The policy should be framed as an opportunity for national 
reconciliation and as a way to strengthen democracy over the military. Since the 
economy is slumping, it could also be marketed as a way to boost the lagging econ-
omy with a very small investment. The excesses of the military budget could also be 
brought to light. It is very important to avoid certain topics such as the role of the 
Palace and to stress the fact that sovereignty will stay in the hands of Thailand. Con-
servative media will surely attempt to distort the news in order to show the policy in 
a bad light. Nationalism should be kept in check by presenting the policy as a way to 
strengthen national unity through economic integration. 
Summary and Conclusions
The violent unrest in the Deep South of Thailand is a top priority issue not only for 
the Thai government but also for the region. Due to the economic and socio-political 
externalities of the conflict, inaction is not an appropriate policy option. Further-
more, as explained in this paper, the present approach has not led to a reduction in 
the violence nor to an economic recovery. Moreover, the post Cold War rise in aspira-
tions for self-determination combined with a renewed unity of the ummah, makes it 
harder to ignore the calls for greater cultural and religious autonomy for the Melayu 
Patani ethnonationality. 
This paper compared and contrasted three broad categories of policy options that 
have been put forward at one point or another as possible solutions to the unrest 
in the Deep South of Thailand. Socio-cultural as well as political and economic fac-
tors were taken into consideration in the analysis so as to determine which category ASEAS 4(1)
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would yield the best results. It was determined that only an approach that grants 
some level of autonomy to the South in addition to promote development would 
prove to be sustainable.
The Greater Pattani Autonomous Administrative and Economic Region was pro-
posed as a policy framework that applies ‘best practices’ from the Chinese experienc-
es in Hong Kong and Macau as well as socio-cultural considerations appropriate for 
the local context. Rather than simply putting forward a proposal for a new adminis-
trative structure, the paper delineated some of the possible political obstacles that 
could be encountered during its implementation as well as several ways in which 
they could be overcome. 
In conclusion, the most appropriate and feasible way to achieve sustainable peace 
in the Deep South of Thailand is to establish the Greater Pattani Autonomous Admin-
istrative and Economic Region and thus grant the area greater self-determination 
on some issues and at the same time integrate it with the country and the region 
through greater economic interdependence. 
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